Citizenship and intercultural relations in eastern-central Europe : a variation on an old tune ?

François Ruegg, anthropologist, University of Fribourg; francois.ruegg@unifr.ch


Abstract


The redefinition of citizenship and the political management of cultural diversity, in the context of the enlargement of the European Union, is of special interest to an anthropologist interested in history.
The present geopolitical situation in eastern-central Europe today is analogous to what it was two centuries ago: the withdrawal of an Empire (in this case the Soviet Empire rather than the Ottoman Empire) created a “void” and the associated need for a redefinition of citizenship and intercultural relations. It appears that a transition period was necessary to fill this void in the interim in order that the citizenry in the region could adapt to the new norms and regulations. In both cases models of citizenship and intercultural relations are forged according to western standards, based on the Enlightenment, viz the succeeding Austrian Empire or now the European Union.
Anthropologists have denounced many times the recurrent confusion between universal and western European values. But this confusion seems to be recurring once again in the context of defining citizenship in a multicultural eastern-central Europe. Comparison of the emergence of “citizen-subjects” in the eastern Austrian Empire during the late 18th century with the present process of becoming a “European free citizen” in the same region reveals a striking analogy. Both in the 18th century and now, the population divides into two categories: the “believers”, those who seek the new identity (citizenship and integration) and the “resistors”, those who refuse it. In terms of political labels we are speaking of progressives and conservatives. The attitude adopted is determined by neither ethnicity or culture nor by the present social status alone, but by people’s decision to maintain or improve their social and economic position.
Paying closer attention to history and ethnography could help avoiding costly mistakes and delusions. Reason no more rules today than yesterday: cultural heritage, propaganda, power, property and money, education and feelings still play a considerable role in people’s convictions, behaviour and decisions. It is this complex interplay of factors and historical influences on behaviour that cultural anthropology strives to clarify, while retaining the perspective of a distant observer.

 


The question of political rights and participation (citizenship in brief) and the relationship among different communities within nation-states (intercultural relations) are discussed everywhere in Europe today and not only in Eastern Europe.
Why is it so, or better who’s concern is it really?
In Eastern Europe, the collapse of the old political regime can easily explain the necessity for new rules for a new game, called “free democracy”. The question remains only: who establishes the rules and based on what principles?

“Time never comes back”, is a popular saying. There are however historical circumstances that seem to recall analogous situations in the past and analogous reactions.
As a cultural anthropologist I believe in the virtue of analogy alongside historical perspective. Analogy is valuable because it reveals strong affinities rather than similarities.
The opening of Eastern Europe’s borders in 1989 evoked to me the opening of almost the same borders in the middle of the 18th Century, when the Ottoman withdrew from Eastern Europe. Together with these comparable “geopolitical”circumstances and framework, the relationship between East and West seems to be equally analogous.

My point is to show how, in both circumstances, then and now, an enlightened ideology, proclaiming itself universal, presided and presides over so-called “dialogue” between Eastern and Western Europe. Once again in the name of the three most vaunted principles of the West, welfare, progress and development, western European culture and values are imposed with very little room for cultural dialogue and variations...and also, as we shall see, with little success.


Reconquista, Militaergrenze, Cordon sanitaire, colonisation


1683-1739
. The Habsburg Empire, an absolute Monarchy, recovers territories in the East. Started after 1683 –after the failed siege of Vienna by Ottoman troops, it continues into the 18th century until the stabilisation of borders in 1739 (Belgrade treaty)
1772-1775. Following the partition of Poland, Galicia (1772) and later with the blessing of Russia, Bukovina (1775) are incorporated into the empire
16-19th century. A steady military presence on the frontiers dating from the late 16th century marks the Eastern end of Europe during the 18th century as well as the 19th century with very few changes. It consists materially of a “wooden wall”( a succession of control towers called chardak) starting at the Croatian seashore and ending in Transylvania. Special units of various ethnic background, such as Uskoken, Vallachs, Raitzen etc., and later Germans as well, are settled on plots of land with their families.
Their duties is to protect the frontiers and simultaneously to work the land and keep cattle. Occasionally they have to join the imperial army, wherever a war breaks out.
1770 A cordon sanitaire is established behind the Militaergrenze to combat the plague.
18th century A vast colonisation of the recovered territories is organised

Summary of the political intentions (aims) of the Emperors:
Maria Theresia (1740-1780) and her son Joseph II (1780-1790 but co-regent from 1765)

Unity, Peace, Welfare (= population growth, security, health and education)
The ways for achieving this aims are reforms and development and the tools law, religion and language, as well as economic growth.

Reform means rewriting the regulations and constitutions concerning public and private status (citizenship), penalties, privileges and duties, property and taxes.

Development applies to population (in number) and to economy (in both growth and technology). It involves, security measures – particularly against fire, hygiene and public education. Finally it concerns the restructuring of land.
This programme can be called a typically progressive “enlightened absolutist” programme.

The Present situation EU and Eastern Europe


The programme of the “enlargement” of the European Union is based on a set of rules and regulations or so called “acquis communautaires.” In a recent lecture, given at the University of Fribourg, M.A.Severin, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE was addressing the question of multiculturalism in Europe. He called the EU enlargement “a positive Western imperialism” because the Union conceives European integration exclusively as a transfer of its model – the acquis communautaires. Meanwhile the entry of the East in the Union, was called by M. Severin (with a touch of humour) the “expansion of Eastern disorder” which could contribute to a synthesis of the European identity. In a more political view he added: “we are dealing with building up a common identity of the “Great Europe” based on a unique set of values and compatible institutions integrated into a unitary management system of continental scope. Therefore, the European process is a matter of power and culture. Those who have the power to transfer to others their own cultural-identitary paradigm increase their power to consolidate their security. From this viewpoint, the acquis communautaires are in fact, acquis identitaires.”

To me, this short reference to the enlargement of the European Union towards the East, encapsulates perfectly the unequal and often fought battle between a self proclaimed order against a claimed disorder in the name of civilisation and progress. Culture and diversity are seen only in terms of advancement and underdevelopment respectively, that is to say in a pure evolutionist perspective.

Let me now return to the 18th Century:

At a macro-social level, personal status was defined and categorised within a combination of privileges and tolerances attributed to different "nations" or peoples. As we know, the very category or concept of nation or rather nations, was already used in the 18th century, before the existence of nation-states. It was then replaced by the term "ethnic minorities". In German (viz in the Austrian administration) one used the term “Nationalisten” to designate without distinction non-German, local (indigenous) people.
In Transylvania the well known system of the 3 nations was confirmed by the Empress: the Diet was formed out of their representatives, the Germans (Saxons colonists established in the late middle ages), the Szekler nobility (a Transylvanian branch of Magyars) and the Magyar nobility. The others ("minorities" by their ethnic background but not in number as it was the case for Romanians) have no political right whatsoever. They consisted of Valachs (Romanians), Gypsies, Jews, Armenians mainly, but also Slavs, Serbs, Croatians, Slovaks and Ukrainians. Many Slavs were enrolled in the Militaergrenze and enjoyed therefore special status and direct relations with the central administration (1).
One of the big issues in the 18th century (and later) was the reunification of the Greek-Catholic with the Roman-Catholic Church. Formally it occurred in 1700 but the status of the members of this new church was not clearly defined. Religious affiliation was linked with political status (citizenship if you like) and they hoped that all Greek-Catholics would form a new nation, i.e. become citizens, with political rights. But it did not happen.
(In 1740 the Empress confirmed the rights and privileges of the 3 nations; in 1742 the rights of the Uniates were established, but the Diet of Transylvania interpreted in 1744 the term “united” as applicable only to the clergy and to noblemen. Therefore the Romanians (Valachs) never became a fourth nation.
It is worth noting that serfdom was abolished in principle in 1781 and torture in 1776 by Joseph II.
We shall also mention the Josefinian project –supported by enlightened Magyar nobility – to liberate Gypsies from serfdom and make them become farmers.
But the personal status of the Austrian emperor’s subject also depended upon his development policy. A vast colonisation (immigration) took place during the 18th century, parallel to the incorporation of soldiers in the military frontier. Their presence and status deeply challenged the legal and political status of the local population –bondsmen and noblemen. As a matter of fact, the colonists enjoyed a special status which could be perhaps compared, with extreme caution and essentially as far as the reactions it created, with the status offered by Hungary only a few months ago to Romanians of Hungarian descent. (The latter can be seen either as an generous offer for a better life or as a diplomatic blunder!)


Ethnography as indicator for social standards


I would like to move from this very general historical account to the field or to the micro-social approach to get a better sense of what “citizenship” meant to different people, in real life as opposed to the imperial regulations.
We can identify two opposing reactions to the enlightened policies and practical measures of the Empire


a.-A strong reaction against any coercive measure coming from the centre


A first general observation of the region in late 18th century shows a vigorous reaction by the landlords and generally by the nobility to any reform or changes, in Transylvania as well as in Galicia and Bukovina. The new status of peasants and the introduction of German language created outrage. Let me quote this report by a German observer in 1793 (2):

“Census taking and numbering of houses were ordered and executed. The number was displayed on the house in big figures before one had the opportunity to understand what it was all about. Hungarians who had been in Bohemia or Austria explained to their neighbours who didn’t know: we are now all Germans and all soldiers. To be soldiers was all right, but Germans, that has profoundly disturbed them. Coupled with the announcement of the introduction of German language, it provoked an explosion. But figures are there and men have been registered in the book of life. Each time that he entered or left his house, the owner could see the number on his way and that exasperated him. Even time did not diminish this obnoxious feeling; on the contrary it was stronger every day. He would have changed his house for a hut, - had he only found one, as long as the number was not there, symbol of his bondage – because this is how he sees it.”

b.- Integration as social promotion


For those who accepted the status quo the new proposed pattern was an incentive to improve their position in society. This implies an acceptance of a new set of values and the understanding of its benefits. Progressive aristocracy and privileged “nations” (Saxons and Szekler in Transylvania) were keen to follow the programme proposed by the Monarch, a programme of equality and welfare. As Colonel Wielhorski wrote in 1782:

“The intention of your Imperial Majesty is too well known to be doubted in this regard. Your Majesty wants a perfect equality among all his subjects; equality of charges (duties) proportional to an individual’s faculties, equality in welfare relative to the class of citizen”
(observe the terms equality, welfare and citizen)


c. Intercultural relations, migrations and conflicts


On the issue of intercultural relations the 18th century sources provide a vast collection of testimonies: mobility, migration, forced migration, immigration and emigration were extremely frequent.
Traditionally, nomads (sheperds) moved from place to place; ruined peasants escaped in migrating, others settled in the state farms of the Militaergrenze or State (Cameral) lands. Soldiers, deserters and refugees added to this extraordinary mobility.
When we come to the sensitive question of intercultural mixing, we have to be cautious and remember that ethnic or national identity was always problematic, since ethnic label was given according to language, religion and even occupation...
Among the Transylvanians, preservation of their culture (unmixing) seems to have lasted until the 19th century, according to this account from 1814:"peoples living in Transylvania keep with a sort of obstinacy to their ways and customs; nothing could convince them to change or modify their character. They all keep with pride their national spirit. Never would they ally with other nations and this is rather ridiculous"
The same seems to apply for Szeklers: "they have much national pride: a Szekler woman would not marry a Valach (Romanian) man, from the defeated race.... Among Szekler, Romanians lose their language and nationality".
But not among Hungarians:"in Hungarian Comitats (districts), in a village populated by Magyar and Valach peasants in equal numbers, the Valach population absorbs the Hungarian one after a while and Romanian language rules. On the contrary among Szeklers the Hungarian element absorbs the Valachian one. Today, one can account for many Szeklers who belong to the Greek religion. They are simply de-nationalised Valachs"(the last account dates 1845).

Reciprocal contempt or “ethnic-hatred” is frequent and well attested. Its expression varied, but the use of pejorative epithets is common (as everywhere...)
Other examples of conflicts of culture embrace the field of economy and technology, between traditional local ways of farming and imported ones, mainly from the German tradition.


But does the historical and political situation I have evoked ring any bells?


What are the analogies between the two world, 18 and 20th century?

As in the former Austrian Empire’s new colonies in the 18th Century, unity is only apparent in most of Eastern Central Europe today. Statistics do not give a real picture, since many “nationals” are still assimilated by their language or their religious affiliation. Furthermore the development policy is imposed from the outside with no consideration for the local experience or local culture. The present entitled nations’ Governments are facing an impossible task: to obtain unity inside their territories, in order to be able to govern, and at the same time to introduce democracy in order to fit European established criteria and enter the Union. In this regard, Governments could be compared with the regional administration of the Empire or the local aristocracy: on the one hand they resist any intrusion of foreign rules to save their own privileges, those of the entitled nation, while on the other hand they try to comply with European standards in order to keep their managing position and longer term interests.

(Differences affect minorities especially in Transylvania where the new ruling nation is composed of Romanians and the traditional ruling nations have become protected minorities (Magyar, Szekler); as far as migrations are concerned, German immigrants have become emigrants: they have left the country to “go back” in Germany (after centuries)

To conclude:

In the perspective of the management of multiculturality and citizenship the analogy between the present enlargement of the European Community and that of the Austrian Monarchy after 1759 can be summarised in the aforementioned opposition :

Assimilation and resistance

Citizenship –although there are different categories of subjects or minorities- is proposed by the State or the Emperor as the only desirable way to attain welfare. Differences- for example religious practices- are tolerated as long as they don’t contradict the progressive model based upon a (western enlightened) individualistic and universal conception of man and culture.
Integration is the motto, and agents for this integration are disseminated among the population: they are colonists in the 18th century and development agents, religious missionaries and NGO’s today. The Uniate church in Transylvania is supporting anew assimilation and integration into the West.
But as we know, Josefinian reforms in the 18th century (which could be interpreted in today’s terminology as transition measures) failed, at least on the short term. Similarly and in many aspects, particularly in economical terms, transition has not happened yet in eastern-central Europe. Nevertheless, one could assume that the part of the population that is able to cope with a western model of citizenship has or will benefit soon from material welfare. This “elite”, far from being an intellectual elite (it includes small businessmen as well as political leaders) will quickly adopt European standards –as did in a less visible way the nomenklatura not so long ago, as well as the provincial nobility in the 18th century. But what will happen to the farmer who, for the first time, is the owner of his piece of land, or with the former State worker with no links to any western “brother” and no NGO training course in language and management? “Mister, you are not modern” (Domnule nu esti modern!): this popular Romanian expression heard many times, illustrates well the recurrent conflict between tradition and innovation in eastern-central Europe.

Resistance of the traditional society: exacerbated nationalism

On the other end of the social spectrum, resistance is the normal reaction to the threat that any external power –even humanist and full of good intentions- brings with it.
As in the 18th century, the perspective of belonging to a “foreign” body stimulates resistance and resentment within a part of the population. These people are naturally going to reinforce the opposition to any effort to unbalance the majority and acquired majority/ethnic privileges. Therefore under what we may consider as pure old fashioned nationalism, historical and cultural resentment is hidden, and it could well still create surprises, as after all it does in western Europe, under the pressure of these new "intruders", the non Schengen immigrants. Orthodoxy for example, has already been taken hostage by the conservative movement. The “bad guys” need more than ever a strong identity. It is perhaps worth mentioning that in both case those who resist the new trend are inevitably pushed in the “bad corner” of the “conservative extreme right” or at least in a remote underdeveloped dark ages humanity.

The question therefore I am asking is: are citizenship, as developed for two centuries in western Europe, and multicuturalism, as it fails to provide ways for the integration of non European citizen today, models to be exported in Eastern Europe?
Is it reasonable to propose outdated models for a new situation we all face viz globalisation?

The analogy I’ve been drafting would certainly need some more field work. But it may eventually stimulate ethnographical micro-social research as an indispensable complement to economic and political perspectives.

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1. The role of the army in smarting up peasants and exposing them to intercultural contact is well known.

2. This and the following quotations are extracted from " A l'est rien de nouveau, de la barbarie à la civilisation", François Ruegg, Georg, Geneva 1991.